No Intifada This Time
Just as diplomacy at the highest level - between Presidents Obama and Putin, and between Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov - has so far failed to defuse the crisis in Ukraine, so it is also failing in yet another quest to bring the Israelis and Palestinians into a formal peace settlement.
Secretary Kerry announced late last summer that his aim was an Israeli/Palestinian "final status agreement" within nine months, that is, the end of this month. A two-state solution would be the outcome. It is clear now, despite nearly frenetic effort, that this was indeed a grand ambition. Mr. Kerry himself now admits that reaching even a "framework agreement", requiring several more months, will be difficult. At this point, any agreement risks ending up being so vague as to be meaningless - at best, broad principles may be endorsed by both sides, but negotiations are suggesting that an agreement would have to include language allowing either party to express "reservations".
That a meaningful settlement is proving so intractable should come as no surprise, given not just the long history of enmity between the two sides, but also the massive gap between the Israeli and Palestinian political economies. On the one hand, Israel is a thriving democracy, with a GDP per capita, at $37,000, some 12 times that of its largest Arab neighbor, Egypt, and far higher than most of the other Arab states and even most EU countries'. Its economy is growing above 3% annually, unemployment is below 6%, inflation is under 2%, its current account balance of payments is strongly positive, and its currency is appreciating against the US dollar. Notwithstanding the ongoing concern with Iran's nuclear program, Israel militarily feels reasonably secure, with only a remote prospect of a third Palestinian intifada (uprising) equivalent to that between 2000 and 2005. Prime Minister Netanyahu is virtually unchallenged politically (even though a majority of Knesset members in his ruling coalition and most government ministers are against or lukewarm towards the two-state solution, outwardly endorsed by Mr. Netanyahu). From this position of strength, he has felt comfortable moving beyond his predecessors in setting Israel's demands: for example, he does not agree that Jerusalem should be shared between the two states, he is allowing the resumption of aggressive expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and he is asking that prior to formal negotiations the Palestinians state their willingness to not only recognize Israel (as the Palestinian Liberation Organization - PLO - did back in 1988), but to define it as a specifically Jewish state.
The Palestinians, on the other hand, negotiate from a much weaker starting point. Their economy can be described in one phrase - on the verge of collapse. And they are politically divided, with PLO leader Mr. Abbas regarded by his own people as a weak and even illegitimate leader of the parts of the West Bank that Israel allows him to govern. At 79, he is being challenged by a much younger Muhammad Dahlan who has courted and received the support of some Gulf states. And Mr. Abbas has no authority at all in the Gaza Strip, where the Islamists of Hamas rule and regularly denounce the PLO. And even if there were one strong Palestinian voice, it would hardly be ready to accept Mr. Netanyahu's additional demands, given the concessions already granted by the Palestinians over the years regarding especially the 1967 border, and agreeing to talk without a settlement freeze.
Secretary Kerry and President Obama are clearly still pushing for a two-state solution, and even seem to be blaming Israel for the fizzling of the current talks. But with Israel strong, and the Palestinian movement weak and divided, and with scant support from its Arab brethren, it is difficult to imagine how American pressure can push both sides to a "final status agreement".