The Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (founded in the Egyptian city of Ismailia in 1928 as a Pan-Islamic religious, political, and social movement) formed, in effect, the principal political opposition in Egypt (and elsewhere in the Arab world) for decades, even though the party was officially illegal, and even though - particularly under Hosni Mubarak - its members were persecuted and banned from participation in political life. All that changed with Egypt's Arab Spring revolution - Mubarak was ousted and the Brotherhood was legalized. Launching a new political arm in 2011, the Freedom and Justice Party, it won 51.7% of the vote in the 2012 national elections, and its leader, Mohamed Morsi, became President.
Finally in power, after so many decades out of it, it's so-far, so-bad, for the Brotherhood. Politically, Morsi's popularity, as high as 79% in September 2012, has dropped precipitously in only a few months. Promising at the time of his electoral victory to be inclusive and tolerant, Morsi has been anything but - forcing an Islamist-inspired new Constitution onto an increasingly secular Egyptian society, granting himself unlimited powers to “protect” the nation, along with the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review, and just this week ordering prosecutors to arrest more political activists, including the Egyptian satirist, Bassem Youssef. This is hardly what the Arab Spring had in mind - Egyptian society has, if anything, become more polarized, politics is harsher and nastier, and violence erupts in the streets more loudly and ever more frequently. The police and army are at best inconsistent in carrying out government directives; security is, even, at times, non-existent. Morsi is on the brink of losing legitimacy and control, and the Egyptian experiment with Islamist rule appears close to failing.
There is a way out. Morsi needs to drastically alter his focus - now - away from imposing an Islamist regime in Egypt, towards restoring the collapsing economy. Conditions are dire, and, as the Economist magazine noted yesterday, deteriorating: "Virtually every economic indicator points to trouble. The currency has slid by 10% since January. Unemployment may be as high as 20%. The stock exchange this year has slumped by a tenth. Tourism, which used to account for 12% of Egypt’s GDP, has evaporated. Foreign investment has dried up. Foreign reserves have shrunk. Many of Egypt’s most dynamic businessmen have fled, fearing they will be arraigned for complicity with Mr Mubarak. The government is threatening to reverse a number of privatisations. Meanwhile, the price of food is soaring at a time when the average family already spends almost half its income to feed itself. A good quarter of Egypt’s 83 million people live below the poverty line".
An IMF team is returning to Cairo this week, to resume discussions regarding a $4.8 billion loan, now urgently needed, but long delayed given the recurring and often violent demonstrations in Egyptian cities. Morsi's government should do two things immediately: first, restructure the cabinet to include secularists and technocrats, much as neighboring Tunisia, facing its own, post-revolution difficulties with governing, implemented last month. This would signal significant recognition of the broad political spectrum characterizing 21st-century Egypt. Secondly, it should commit itself to, this time, finalizing the IMF negotiations - even though it will require acceptance of harsh reform measures, such as removal of fuel and food subsidies. With an IMF loan in place, additional, bilateral government aid, and private foreign direct investment, would resume. The economy would then be poised to begin what would nonetheless be a very long road back.